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Abstract
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed.
The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and
is applicable to games with constrained strategy sets and weight-balanced communication graphs. We analyze the complex
interaction of these dynamics with the help of input-to-state stability (ISS). By scaling algorithm parameters to render a
small-gain condition, we obtain an exponential convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium. In addition,
a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of our methods.
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1 Introduction
(Gharesifard, Bas¸ar & Dominguez-Garcia 2016, Ye &
Hu 2018, Salehisadaghiani, Shi & Pavel 2019, Yi & Pavel
2019, Zeng, Chen, Liang & Hong 2019) (Osborne &
Rubinstein 1994, Barrera & Garcia 2015, Cornes 2016,
Ye & Hu 2017, Nocke & Schutz 2018, Koshal, Nedic´
& Shanbhag 2016) (Ye & Hu 2017, Liang, Yi & Hong
2017, Deng & Nian 2019, Zhang, Liang, Wang & Ji
2019, Parise, Gentile & Lygeros 2019, Shi, Anderson
& Helmke 2017, Yi, Hong & Liu 2016) (Yuan, Ho &
Jiang 2018, Yang, Wang & Liu 2018, Yang, Yi, Wu
et al. 2019, Hong, Jiang & Feng 2010, Nedic´, Olshevsky &
Shi 2017, Liang, Wang & Yin 2019, Desoer & Vidyasagar
1975, Jiang, Teel & Praly 1994, Lei & Shanbhag 2019)
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking with game-
theoretic formul tion and multi-agent system consider-
ation has receiv d research atte tion from the control
and op imization communities, partially due to its ap-
plications in smart grids, communication networks and
artificial intelligence. Vario s distributed algorithms
for Nash equilibr um or gener lized Nash equilibrium
seeking hav be developed, which guide a group of
discr te-time or continuous-time agents to achieve the
equilibrium based on local data and information ex-
ch nge over a etwork graph (Gharesifard et al. 2016, Ye
& Hu 2018, Salehisadaghiani et al. 2019, Yi &
Pavel 2019, Zeng et al. 2019, Lei & Shanbhag 2019).
Aggregative games have become an important type of
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Fax +86-10-82541832.
Email addresses: sliang@ustb.edu.cn (Shu Liang),
yipeng@tongji.edu.cn (Peng Yi), yghong@iss.ac.cn
(Yiguang Hong), kaixiang@ustb.edu.cn (Kaixiang Peng).
games since the well-known Cournot duopoly model
was proposed (Osborne & Rubinstein 1994), where the
strategic interaction is clearly characterized via an ag-
gregation term. Recently, aggregative games have been
considered in congestion control of communication net-
works (Barrera & Garcia 2015), public environmental
models (Cornes 2016), demand response management
of power systems (Ye & Hu 2017), and multiproduct-
firm oligopoly (Nocke & Schutz 2018). Because of the
large-scale systems involved in these problems, seeking
or computing the Nash equilibrium in a distributed
manner is of practical significance.
We consider distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of ag-
gregative games, where the aggregation information is
unavailable to each local player and the communica-
tion graph can be directed with balanced weights. Sim-
ilar problems have also been investigated in (Koshal
et al. 2016, Ye & Hu 2017, Liang et al. 2017, Deng
& Nian 2019, Zhang et al. 2019, Parise et al. 2019).
In this work, a small-gain based design is proposed for
the considered problem. First, a distributed projected
gradient play dynamics is designed, where we replace
the global aggregation by its local estimation to cal-
culate the gradient. Then an average tracking dynam-
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ics is augmented, where the distributed tracking sig-
nals are local parts of the aggregation. Inspired by the
powerful small-gain technique referring to (Desoer &
Vidyasagar 1975, Jiang et al. 1994), we analyze these
complex interconnected dynamics and prove that our
distributed algorithm achieves an exponential conver-
gence to the Nash equilibrium when the tunable param-
eters are larger/smaller than some constant bounds.
The contributions of this brief paper are as follows:
• A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm for
aggregative game is developed. The algorithm is de-
signed with two interconnected dynamics: a projected
gradient play dynamics for equilibrium seeking and
a distributed average tracking dynamics for estima-
tion of the aggregation. The projected part can deal
with local constrained strategy sets, which general-
izes those in (Ye & Hu 2017, Zhang et al. 2019). Also,
the distributed average tracking dynamics applies to
weight-balanced directed graphs, which improves the
algorithm in (Liang et al. 2017).
• Exponential convergence of the proposed distributed
algorithm is obtained, which is consistent with the
convergence results in (Yi et al. 2016, Ye & Hu 2017,
Deng & Nian 2019) for unconstrained problems and
is stronger than those in (Yi et al. 2016, Deng &
Nian 2019) for constrained ones. In other words, this
is a first work, to our knowledge, to propose an ex-
ponentially convergent distributed algorithm for ag-
gregative games with local feasible constraints.
• To solve our problem, we develop a method based on
exponential input-to-state stability (eISS) and small-
gain technique. In fact, the method can also be applied
to many problems discussed in previous works such
as (Ye & Hu 2017, Liang et al. 2017, Deng & Nian
2019, Zhang et al. 2019) for aggregative games and
(Gharesifard et al. 2016, Ye & Hu 2018, Zeng et al.
2019, Lei & Shanbhag 2019) for other types of games.
In summary, this work provides new algorithm design
and analysis approach to solve distributed Nash equilib-
rium seeking of aggregative games over weight-balanced
directed graphs. In addition, the proposed method may
facilitate distributed optimization (Shi et al. 2017, Yuan
et al. 2018, Yang et al. 2018, Yang et al. 2019), especially
for design and analysis of an exponentially convergent
distributed optimization algorithm.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows
some basic concepts and preliminary results, while
Section 3 formulates the distributed Nash equilibrium
seeking problem of aggregative games. Then Section 4
presents our main results including algorithm design
and analysis. Section 5 gives a numerical example to
illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
Finally, Section 6 gives concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give basic notations and related pre-
liminary knowledge.
Denote Rn as the n-dimensional real vector space; de-
note 1n = (1, ..., 1)
T ∈ Rn, and 0n = (0, ..., 0)T ∈ Rn.
Denote col(x1, ..., xn) = (x
T
1 , ..., x
T
n )
T as the column vec-
tor stacked with column vectors x1, ..., xn, ‖ · ‖ as the
Euclidean norm, and In ∈ Rn×n as the identity matrix.
Denote ∇f as the gradient of f .
A set C ⊆ Rn is convex if λz1 + (1 − λ)z2 ∈ C for any
z1, z2 ∈ C and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. For a closed convex set C, the
projection map PC : Rn → C is defined as
PC(x) , argmin
y∈C
‖x− y‖.
The projection map is 1-Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
‖PC(x)− PC(y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖, ∀x, y ∈ Rn.
A map F : Rn → Rn is said to be µ-strongly monotone
on a set Ω if
(x− y)T (F (x)− F (y)) ≥ µ‖x− y‖2, ∀x, y ∈ Ω.
Given a subset Ω ⊆ Rn and a map F : Ω → Rn, the
variational inequality problem, denoted by VI(Ω, F ), is
to find a vector x∗ ∈ Ω such that
(y − x∗)TF (x∗) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ Ω,
and the set of solutions to this problem is denoted by
SOL(Ω, F ) (Facchinei & Pang 2003). When Ω is closed
and convex, the solution of VI(Ω, F ) can be equivalently
reformulated via projection as follows:
x ∈ SOL(Ω, F )⇔ x = PΩ(x− αF (x)), ∀α > 0.
It is known that the information exchange among agents
can be described by a graph. A graph with node set
V = {1, 2, ..., N} and edge set E is written as G =
(V, E) (Godsil & Royle 2001). The adjacency matrix
of G can be written as A = [aij ]N×N , where aij > 0
if (j, i) ∈ E (meaning that agent j can send its infor-
mation to agent i, or equivalently, agent i can receive
some information from agent j), and aij = 0, other-
wise. A graph is said to be strongly connected if, for
any pair of vertices, there exists a sequence of inter-
mediate vertices connected by edges. For i ∈ V, the
weighted in-degree and out-degree are diin =
∑N
j=1 aij
and diout =
∑N
j=1 aji, respectively. A graph is weight-
balanced if diin = d
i
out,∀ i ∈ V. The Laplacian matrix is
L = Din − A, where Din = diag{d1in, . . . , dNin} ∈ RN×N .
The following result is well known.
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Lemma 1 Graph G is weight-balanced if and only if
L+ LT is positive semidefinite; it is strongly connected
only if zero is a simple eigenvalue of L.
Finally, a useful stability concept is introduced as fol-
lows. A dynamical system z˙ = f(z,u) with f(z∗,u∗) =
0 for some point (z∗,u∗) is said to be exponential finite-
gain input-to-state stable (eISS) if ∀ t ≥ 0,
‖z(t)− z∗‖ ≤ ρ(‖z(0)− z∗‖, t) + γ sup
0≤τ≤t
‖u(τ)− u∗‖,
for an exponentially convergent term ρ(·, t) and a con-
stant γ > 0.
Remark 1 The eISS indicates that, in the absence of
the external disturbance, the system can converge to
its equilibrium with an exponential rate. In fact, ISS
plays an important role in nonlinear systems control
with fruitful results, and has further extensions such
as the finite-time ISS for nonsmooth synthesis (Hong
et al. 2010). Also, it enables the celebrated small-gain
technique for the stability/convergence analysis of inter-
connected dyanmics (Jiang et al. 1994).
3 Problem Formulation
Consider an N -player aggregative game as follows. For
i ∈ V , {1, ..., N}, the ith player aims to minimize its
cost function Ji(xi, x−i) : Ω → R by choosing the lo-
cal decision variable xi from a local strategy set Ωi ⊂
Rni , where x−i , col(x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xN ), Ω ,
Ω1 × · · · × ΩN ⊂ Rn and n =
∑
i∈V ni. The strategy
profile of this game is x , col(x1, ..., xN ) ∈ Ω. The
aggregation map σ : Rn → Rm, to specify the cost
function as Ji(xi, x−i) = ϑi(xi, σ(x)) with a function
ϑi : Rni+m → R, is defined as
σ(x) , 1
N
N∑
i=1
ϕi(xi), (1)
where ϕi : Rni → Rm is a map for the local contribution
to the aggregation.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is introduced as follows.
Definition 1 A strategy profile x∗ is said to be an Nash
equilibrium of the game if
Ji(x
∗
i , x
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(yi, x∗−i), ∀ yi ∈ Ωi, ∀ i ∈ V. (2)
Condition (2) means that all players simultaneously take
their own best (feasible) responses at x∗, where no player
can further decrease its cost function by changing its
decision variable unilaterally.
We assume that the strategy sets and the cost functions
are well-conditioned in the following sense.
A1: For any i ∈ V, Ωi is nonempty, convex and closed.
A2: For any i ∈ V, the cost function Ji(xi, x−i) and the
map ϕ(xi) are differentiable with respect to xi.
In order to explicitly show the aggregation of the game,
let us define map Gi : Rni × Rm → Rni , i ∈ V as
Gi(xi, ηi) , ∇xiJi(·, x−i)|σ(x)=ηi (3)
= (∇xiϑi(·, σ) +
1
N
∇σϑi(xi, ·)T∇ϕi)|σ=ηi .
Also, let G(x,η) , col(G1(x1, η1), ..., GN (xN , ηN )).
Clearly, G(x,1N ⊗ σ(x)) = F (x), where the pseudo-
gradient map F : Rn → Rn is defined as
F (x) , col{∇x1J1(·, x−1), ...,∇xNJN (·, x−N )}.
Under A1 and A2, the Nash equilibrium of the game is a
solution of the variational inequality problem VI(Ω, F ),
referring to (Facchinei & Pang 2003). Moreover, we need
the following assumptions to ensure the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and also to facilitate
algorithm design.
A3: The map F (x) is µ-strongly monotone on Ω for some
constant µ > 0.
A4: The map G(x,η) is κ1-Lipschitz continuous with
respect to x ∈ Ω and κ2-Lipschitz continuous with
respect to η for some constants κ1, κ2 > 0. Also, for
any i ∈ V, ϕi is κ3-Lipschitz continuous on Ωi for
some constant κ3 > 0.
Note that the strong monotonicity of the pseudo-
gradient map F has been widely adopted in the lit-
erature such as (Ye & Hu 2017, Ye & Hu 2018, Sale-
hisadaghiani et al. 2019, Yi & Pavel 2019, Deng &
Nian 2019, Zhang et al. 2019, Parise et al. 2019).
The following fundamental result is from (Facchinei &
Pang 2003).
Lemma 2 Under A1-A4, the considered game admits
a unique Nash equilibrium x∗.
In the distributed design for our aggregative game, the
communication topology for each player to exchange in-
formation is assumed as follows.
A5: The network graph G is strongly connected and
weight-balanced.
The goal of this paper is to design a distributed algo-
rithm to seek the Nash equilibrium for the considered
aggregative game over weight-balanced directed graph.
4 Main Results
In this section, we first propose our distributed algorithm
and then analyze its convergence.
4.1 Algorithm
Our distributed continuous-time algorithm for Nash
equilibrium seeking of the considered aggregative game
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is designed as the following differential equations:
x˙i = PΩi(xi − αGi(xi, ηi))− xi, xi(0) ∈ Ωi
θ˙i = β
N∑
j=1
aij(ηj − ηi), θi(0) = 0m
ηi = θi + ϕi(xi)
(4)
Algorithm parameters α and β satisfy
0 < α <
2µ
κ2
,
β >
2κ2 · κ3(2 + 2α · κ+ α · µ)
λ2(2µ− α · κ2) ,
(5)
where
κ , κ1 + κ2 · κ3, (6)
and λ2 is the smallest positive eigenvalue of
1
2 (L+ L
T )
(L is the Laplacian matrix).
The compact form of (4) can be written as

x˙ = PΩ(x− αG(x,η))− x, x(0) ∈ Ω
θ˙ = −βL⊗ Imη, θ(0) = 0mN
η = θ +ϕ(x)
(7)
whereϕ(x) = col(ϕ1(x1), ..., ϕN (xN )). Furthermore, we
can rewrite (7) as x˙ = PΩ(x− αG(x,η))− x, x(0) ∈ Ωη˙ = −βL⊗ Imη + d
dt
ϕ(x), η(0) = ϕ(x(0))
(8)
The dynamics with respect to x can be regarded as
distributed projected gradient play dynamics with the
global aggregation σ(x) replaced by local variables
η1, ..., ηN . The dynamics with respect to η is distributed
average tracking dynamics that estimates the value of
σ(x). The design idea is similar to (Ye & Hu 2017, Liang
et al. 2017). Here, we use projection operation to deal
with local feasible constraints, and replace the nons-
mooth tracking dynamics in (Liang et al. 2017) by this
simple one to cope with weight-balanced graphs.
4.2 Analysis
First, we verify that the equilibrium of dynamics (8)
coincides with the Nash equilibrium x∗.
Theorem 1 Under A1 - A5, the equilibrium of dynam-
ics (8) is
[
x
η
]
=
[
x∗
η∗
]
=
[
x∗
1N ⊗ σ(x∗)
]
. (9)
Proof. The equilibrium of (8) should satisfy
0n = PΩ(x− αG(x,η))− x
0mN = −L⊗ Imη
which are obtained by setting x˙, η˙ and ddtϕ(x) as zeros.
Since G is strongly connected, L ⊗ Imη = 0 implies
η1 = η2 = · · · = ηN = η for some η to be further
determined.
Since G is weight-balanced, 1TNL = 0TN . Combining this
property with dynamics (8) yields
1
N
N∑
i=1
η˙i =
d
dt
σ(x),
1
N
N∑
i=1
ηi(0) = σ(x(0)).
As a result,
1
N
N∑
i=1
ηi = σ(x), (10)
which implies that any equilibrium pair (x,1N ⊗ η)
should also satisfy η = σ(x).
Substituting x,1N ⊗η into the projected equation for
the equilibrium yields
0n = PΩ(x
 − αG(x,1N ⊗ η))− x
= PΩ(x
 − αF (x))− x,
which indicates x = x∗. Therefore, the point given in
(9) is the equilibrium of (8). This completes the proof.

In view of the identity (10) derived from (8), let
y , η − 1N ⊗ σ(x).
Then it follows from L1N = 0N and (8) that
x˙ = PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)− x (11)
y˙ = −βL⊗ Imy + d
dt
(
ϕ(x)− 1N ⊗ σ(x)
)
(12)
= −βL⊗ Imy +
(∇ϕ(x)− 1N ⊗∇σ(x))T ·(
PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)− x)
The whole dynamics with respect to x and y is consist
of two interconnected subsystems as shown in Fig. 1.
Each dynamical subsystem has its own state variable,
equilibrium point and external input.
The following lemma gives a criterion for eISS. Readers
can refer to (Khalil 2002) for more details.
Lemma 3 Consider a dynamical system z˙ = f(z,u)
with f(z∗,u∗) = 0. Suppose that V (z) = 12‖z− z∗‖2 is
an Lyapunov function such that
V˙ (z) ≤ −ω‖z − z∗‖2 + ω · γ‖z − z∗‖‖u− u∗‖,
4
Fig. 1. The interconnection of two subsystems (11) and (12).
for some constants ω, γ > 0. Then the system is (ω, γ)-
eISS with
‖z(t)−z∗‖ ≤ ‖z(0)−z∗‖ exp(−ωt)+γ sup
0≤τ≤t
‖u(τ)−u∗‖.
Proof. Let W (z) =
√
V (z). When V (z) 6= 0,
W˙ =
V˙
2
√
V
≤ −ω‖z − z
∗‖2 + ω · γ‖z − z∗‖‖u− u∗‖
2
√
V
= −ωW + ω · γ√
2
‖u− u∗‖.
Therefore,
W (z(t)) ≤W (z(0)) exp(−ωt)
+
ω · γ√
2
∫ t
0
exp(−ω(t− τ))(u(τ)− u∗)dτ
≤W (z(0)) exp(−ωt) + γ√
2
sup
0≤τ≤t
‖u(τ)− u∗‖,
which implies
‖z(t)− z∗‖ =
√
2W (z(t)) ≤ ‖z(0)− z∗‖ exp(−ωt)
+ γ sup
0≤τ≤t
‖u(τ)− u∗‖.
Note that the above inequality also holds for V (z) = 0.
This completes the proof.

Our convergence results are given in the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 2 Under A1-A5, the distributed continuous-
time algorithm (4) with parameters satisfying (5) con-
verges to the Nash equilibrium with an exponential con-
vergence rate.
Proof. We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1: We prove that dynamics (11) is (ω1, γ1)-eISS,
where
ω1 ,
2α · µ− α2 · κ2
2 + α · κ , γ1 ,
κ2(2 + α · κ)
2µ− α · κ2 .
Define
H(x) , x− PΩ(x− αF (x)),
H˜(x,y) , x− PΩ(x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)),
ξ(x,y) , H˜(x,y)−H(x).
We verify the following three properties.
1) ‖ξ(x,y)‖ ≤ α · κ2‖y‖.
2) The map F is κ-Lipschitz continuous.
3) The map H is ω1-strongly monotone.
Property 1) holds because
‖ξ(x,y)‖ = ‖H˜(x,y)−H(x)‖
= ‖PΩ(x− αF (x))
− PΩ(x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y))‖
≤ α‖F (x)−G(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y))‖
≤ α · κ2‖y‖.
Property 2) follows from the fact that
‖F (y)− F (x)‖
= ‖G(y,1N ⊗ σ(y))−G(x,1N ⊗ σ(x))‖
≤ ‖G(y,1N ⊗ σ(x)−G(x,1N ⊗ σ(x))‖
+ ‖G(y,1N ⊗ σ(y))−G(y,1N ⊗ σ(x))‖
≤ κ1‖y − x‖+ κ2 · κ3‖y − x‖.
Property 3) holds because
(x− y)T (H(x)−H(y))
= ‖x− y‖2 − (x− y)T ·
(PΩ(x− αF (x))− PΩ(y − αF (y)))
≥ ‖x− y‖(‖x− y‖
− ‖PΩ(x− αF (x))− PΩ(y − αF (y))‖)
≥ ‖x− y‖(‖x− y‖ − ‖x− αF (x)− (y − αF (y))‖,
and
‖x− y‖ − ‖x− αF (x)− (y − αF (y))‖
=
‖x− y‖2 − ‖x− αF (x)− (y − αF (y))‖2
‖x− y‖+ ‖x− αF (x)− (y − αF (y))‖
≥ 2α(x− y)
T (F (x)− F (y))− α2‖F (x)− F (y)‖2
(2 + α · κ)‖x− y‖
≥ 2α · µ− α
2 · κ2
2 + α · κ ‖x− y‖.
In addition, there holds the identity H(x∗) = 0, since
x∗ is the Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following Lyapunov candidate function
V (x) =
1
2
‖x− x∗‖2.
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Its time derivative along the trajectory of (11) is
V˙ = −(x− x∗)T H˜(x,y)
= −(x− x∗)T (H(x) + ξ(x,y))
= −(x− x∗)T (H(x)−H(x∗))− (x− x∗)T ξ(x,y)
≤ −ω1‖x− x∗‖2 + ‖x− x∗‖‖ξ(x,y)‖
≤ −ω1‖x− x∗‖2 + α · κ2‖x− x∗‖‖y‖.
It follows from Lemma 3 that dynamics (11) is (ω1, γ1)-
eISS. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: We prove that dynamics (12) is (ω2, γ2)-eISS,
where
ω2 , β · λ2 − α · κ2 · κ3, γ2 , κ3 · (2 + α · κ)
β · λ2 − α · κ2 · κ3 .
Let
ζ(x,y) , d
dt
(ϕ(x)− 1N ⊗ σ(x))
=
(∇ϕ(x)− 1N ⊗∇σ(x))T ·(
PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)− x),
where the time derivative x˙ is along the dynamics (11).
Clearly, 1TN ⊗ Imζ(x,y) = 0. Also, since
‖PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)− x∗‖
≤ ‖PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)
− PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x))
)‖
+ ‖PΩ
(
x− αF (x))− PΩ(x∗ − αF (x∗))‖
≤ α · κ2‖y‖+ ‖x− x∗‖+ α · κ‖x− x∗‖,
there holds
‖ζ(x,y)‖ ≤ ‖∇ϕ(x)− 1N ⊗∇σ(x)‖·
‖PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)− x‖
≤ κ3‖PΩ
(
x− αG(x,1N ⊗ σ(x) + y)
)− x∗‖
+ κ3‖x− x∗‖
≤ κ3 · (2 + α · κ)‖x− x∗‖+ α · κ2 · κ3‖y‖.
Let
ŷ , 1
N
1N1
T
N ⊗ Imy,
ŷ⊥ , (IN − 1
N
1N1
T
N )⊗ Imy.
Then y = ŷ+ ŷ⊥. Since 1TNL = 0
T
N , it follows from (12)
that
˙̂y = 0, ŷ(0) = 0.
As a result,
ŷ(t) = 0, y(t) = ŷ⊥(t), ∀ t ≥ 0.
Consider the following Lyapunov candidate function
V (y) =
1
2
‖y‖2.
The time derivative of V along the trajectory of (12) is
V˙ = −βyT (L⊗ Im)y + yT ζ(x,y)
= −βyT
(
1
2
(L+ LT )⊗ Im
)
y + yT ζ(x,y)
= −β(ŷ⊥)T
(
1
2
(L+ LT )⊗ Im
)
ŷ⊥ + yT ζ(x,y)
≤ −β · λ2‖ŷ⊥‖2 + yT ζ(x,y),
where the last inequality follows from Rayleigh quotient
theorem (Horn & Johnson 2013, Page 234).
Also, since y(t) = ŷ⊥(t), ∀ t ≥ 0,
V˙ ≤ −β · λ2‖ŷ⊥‖2 + yT ζ(x,y)
= −β · λ2‖y‖2 + yT ζ(x,y)
≤ −(β · λ2 − α · κ2 · κ3)‖y‖2
+ κ3 · (2 + α · κ)‖y‖‖x− x∗‖.
Therefore, it follows from Lemma 3 that dynamics (12)
is (ω2, γ2)-eISS. This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: We prove that the distributed algorithm (4) con-
verges to the Nash equilibrium with an exponential rate.
It follows from the results given in Step 1 and Step 2 that
‖x(t)−x∗‖ ≤ ‖x(0)−x∗‖ exp(−ω1t)+γ1 sup
0≤τ≤t
‖y(τ)‖,
and
‖y(t)‖ ≤ ‖y(0)‖ exp(−ω2t) + γ2 sup
0≤τ≤t
‖x(τ)− x∗‖.
Moreover, condition (5) indicates that
γ1 · γ2 < 1.
Therefore,
sup
0≤τ≤t
‖x(τ)−x∗‖ ≤ 1
1− γ1 · γ2 ‖x(0)−x
∗‖ exp(−ω1t)
+
γ1
1− γ1 · γ2 ‖y(0)‖ exp(−ω2t).
This completes the whole proof.

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Remark 2 In our analysis, the eISS properties of the
projected equilibrium seeking dynamics (11) and the dis-
tributed average tracking dynamics (12) play a key role.
To establish the eISS of these dynamics is not a trivial
work and relies on a few newly derived results such as
the ω1-strong monotonicity of the mapH. Moreover, the
Lyapunov functions adopted here, though very simple,
are different from those used in (Yi et al. 2016, Liang
et al. 2017) for projected dynamics. The Lyapunov func-
tion based analyses given in those works are sufficient
to guarantee convergence, but they may not be easily
extended to establish an eISS result.
Remark 3 Exponential convergence of distributed al-
gorithms has become a research topic in recent years.
(Nedic´ et al. 2017) has designed a distributed discrete-
time optimization algorithm and proves its exponen-
tial convergence via a small-gain approach, while (Liang
et al. 2019) has introduced a criterion for the exponen-
tial convergence of distributed primal-dual gradient al-
gorithms in either continuous or discrete time. Theorem
2 provides a new method to establish the exponential
convergence of distributed continuous-time Nash equi-
librium seeking dynamics. More specifically, it follows
from the proof of Theorem 2 that eISS property plus
small-gain condition for interconnected subsystems im-
ply exponential convergence of the whole system.
5 Numerical Example
Consider a Cournot game played by N = 20 competi-
tive players. For i ∈ V = {1, ..., N}, the cost function
ϑi(xi, σ) and strategy set Ωi are
ϑi(xi, σ) = aix
2
i + bixi + cixiσ(x),
Ωi =
[
− 1− 1
2i
,
i
10
+
1√
i
]
,
where
ai = 0.1 + 0.01 ∗ sin(i), bi = i− ln(i)
1 + i+ i3
,
ci = 0.003 ∗ cos(i),
and
σ(x) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
xj .
It can be verified that the game mode satisfies A1-
A4 with constants µ = 0.1770, κ1 = 0.2199, κ2 =
0.0030, κ3 = 1. We adopt a network graph as shown in
Fig. 2, which satisfies A5.
To render condition (5), we assign α = 3 and β = 1. The
trajectory of strategy profile generated by our algorithm
is shown in Fig. 3.
In order to make some comparisons, we also use directed
cycle graph and undirected Erdos-Renyi (ER) graph for
the algorithm. The performance of the algorithm with
Fig. 2. The communication graph of the agents.
Fig. 3. The trajectory of strategy profile generated by our
distributed algorithm.
these graphs is shown in Fig. 4. The theoretical rates
ω1, ω2 obtained by using the formulas in the proof of
Theorem 2 and the real one ω identified from the tra-
jectory are given in Table 1. These results indicate that
Fig. 4. Performance of the algorithm with different graphs.
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Table 1
Gain and convergence rate estimation with different graphs
graph λ2 γ1 · γ2 ω1 ω2 ω
original 0.2872 0.3700 0.2306 0.2783 0.5296
cycle 0.0489 2.5712 0.2306 0.0400 0.1630
ER 0.0955 1.1884 0.2306 0.0866 0.2117
our distributed algorithm exponentially converges to the
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the convergence may still
hold when the small gain condition is violated. This phe-
nomenon is reasonable because the our theoretical esti-
mations may be conservative.
Finally, we use the undirected ER graph to compare our
algorithm with the one given in (Liang et al. 2017). The
numerical results are shown in Fig. 5. It indicates that
our algorithm converges faster than that algorithm. In
addition, only our algorithm applies to directed graphs
such as the original graph and the directed cycle graph.
Fig. 5. Performance comparison of the two distributed algo-
rithms.
6 Conclusions
A distributed algorithm has been proposed for Nash
equilibrium seeking of aggregative games, where the
strategy set can be constrained and the network is de-
scribed by a weight-balanced graph. The eISS of each
dynamics has been revealed, and the exponential con-
vergence has been established under the small-gain
condition. The effectiveness of our method has also been
illustrated by a numerical example. Further work may
consider generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem
for aggregative games with coupled constraints.
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